Legal considerations have always played a critical role in the development of a sign code, but that role has taken on renewed importance in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015 . A detailed analysis of Reed is obviously beyond the scope of this paper.
1 For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Reed Court announced a far more stringent test to determine whether a sign code's provisions are "content-neutral" or "content-based." In short, the Court ruled that any sign code provision that "on its face" considers the message on a sign to determine how it will be regulated is contentbased. 2 The practical effect of finding that a sign code provision is content-based is to heighten the judicial scrutiny of such a provision if challenged. A provision that is content-neutral is subjected only to intermediate judicial scrutiny: the provision will be upheld if government can demonstrate that the regulation serves a substantial governmental interest and is narrowlytailored to achieve that interest. In contrast, a provision that is content-based is subjected to strict judicial scrutiny: the provision will be upheld only if government can demonstrate that the regulation serves a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive alternative to achieve that interest.
3
A case exemplifying how much Reed has affected court review of sign regulations that contain content-based provisions, normally found in "exemptions" is Central Radio Co. Inc. v.
City of Norfolk, Va. 4 There, in a challenge first decided before Reed, the Fourth Circuit Court of concerns.
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Sign code drafting is an often imprecise exercise, subject to the influences of planning, law, and, perhaps most importantly, local politics. Planners and local government lawyers should therefore view sign regulation with an eye toward risk management. If the local government is willing to tolerate some degree of legal risk, it may be appropriate to take a more aggressive, if less constitutionally-tested approach to sign regulation. Conversely, if the local government is unwilling to accept the risks associated with more rigorous regulation of signs, it would be advisable to adopt a more strictly content neutral-if less aesthetically effectiveapproach.
In a risk management approach to sign regulation, the local government's adopted regulations should reflect a balance between the community's desire to achieve certain regulatory objectives and the community's tolerance for legal risk. Regardless of some of the uncertainties that remain about the substantive reach of the Reed decision, 9 Reed clearly increases the level of legal risk associated with many aspects of sign regulation, and most particularly regulation of non-commercial signs. Thus, while communities are well-advised to review sign regulations for potential areas of content discrimination and to take precautions against potential sign litigation, when developing a sign code communities should also consider (or perhaps reconsider) the level of legal risk that the community is willing to tolerate in order to achieve the community's aesthetic goals and interests in traffic safety. In some areas of sign regulation and for some local jurisdictions, achieving aesthetic goals may run counter to minimizing legal risk, and it will be up to planners, lawyers, political leaders, and community In all communities, special care should be taken to avoid regulating signs that have minimal impact on the community's established interests in sign regulation. For example, avoiding regulation of signs which are not visible from a public right-of-way, or which are so as to have a negligible visual impact, is good sign regulation practice and is in keeping with the notion that regulations should only go as far as necessary to further the interests of the regulating body. In the same vein, communities should focus on addressing "problem areas" of sign regulation specific to the community instead of regulating for problems that do not exist.
Employing this approach to sign regulation will likely result in the outcomes desired by the community while providing an appropriate level of protection against costly and time-consuming litigation. With these observations in mind, here is some practical advice on dealing with legal issues in sign code development and regulation in the post-Reed world.
A.
Review Your Current Sign Code for Content-Based Provisions
Because local sign codes frequently contain at least some areas of content bias, a community should undertake a painstaking review of its current sign code to determine where and how the code exhibits the forms of content discrimination called into question by Reed.
Local sign codes are often an amalgam of regulatory provisions enacted to respond to discrete sign regulation problems that have previously arisen. Further, "common sense" reactions to many sign regulation problems may raise the greatest problems in First Amendment analysis; for example, addressing a proliferation of temporary political signs by imposing strict regulations on such signs would likely prove problematic if scrutinized by a court following Reed. Where a municipal attorney or local planner lacks certainty as to whether a particular provision is content neutral, contact a lawyer well-versed in First Amendment issues and sign regulation. Even if a sign code "fix" is not possible in the near term, knowing the sign code's areas of vulnerability, and coaching permitting and enforcement staff to limit potential problems, can be a crucial step toward protecting a local government from liability.
To guide the process of reviewing local codes for content based provisions, here is a short list of critical areas to review for existing codes and to consider in developing a new code. Cir. 2016 )(ruling that sign code exempting certain displays, including any "flag or emblem" of any government or "religious organization" and "works of art" that do not identify/relate to a product or service was a content-based restriction that did not withstand strict scrutiny) and Marin v. Town of Southeast, 136 F.Supp.3d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding that regulation that exempted certain signs, but not political signs, from restrictions placed on temporary signage, was a content-based restriction that did not withstand strict scrutiny). 
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On the narrow tailoring side, local governments should consider whether the exceptions to permitting requirements further the asserted purpose for the sign code or are at least sufficiently limited to avoid undercutting the stated purpose. For example, if a code contains the express goal of eliminating sign clutter to improve traffic safety and aesthetics, does allowing "Grand Opening Signs" somehow nullify that aesthetic interest-or nullify the government's interest in prohibiting myriad other temporary signs? Or if a code allows certain types of unpermitted noncommercial signs to be larger than real estate signs, is the government undermining its general interest in reducing driver distractions (since drivers can be distracted just as easily by political signs as by real estate signs)? Removing content-based definitions from exceptions to permitting requirements, and reconsidering whether the exceptions undermine the regulatory purposes of the sign code will assist local governments in mitigating liability going forward.
Clearly, After Reed, exceptions to permitting requirements are extremely problematic. It follows that the number of permitting exceptions should be reduced wherever possible, while maintaining those permitted exceptions-and their definitions-that are necessary to reduce litigation risk or achieve stated goals of the sign code. The same holds true for differentiallytreated categories of signs. The sign code in Reed contained 23 categorical exceptions to the town's basic permitting requirement. Regardless of the rationales for the enactment of these 23 exceptions, one can assume that at least some of these exceptions-and the differential treatment between the various categories of exceptions-were unnecessary to achieve the code's stated goals of traffic safety and community aesthetics. My experience in sign regulation strongly suggests that excessive "slicing and dicing" of sign categories frequently leads to more litigation The foregoing is not to say, however, that local governments should avoid all exceptions to permitting and require permits for all signs. Permitting requirements carry additional constitutional obligations for local governments, most importantly the obligation to avoid unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. For a permitting requirement to avoid such concerns, it should contain adequate procedural safeguards. Such a requirement should provide strict yet brief review timeframes to which the local government must adhere and must not vest unbridled discretion in local government officials, i.e., the code should contain clearly-articulated approval criteria for signs subject to a permit.
12 If a local government opts to require that noncommercial signs be permitted prior to installation, the code should avoid content discrimination in the requirements for permitted noncommercial signs. Precisely because of prior restraint concerns and the sensitivity of noncommercial sign owners to prior restraints, many local governments opt to except certain forms of noncommercial signage from permitting requirements. If the sign code drafters desire to except political signs from a permitting requirement, that exception-and the treatment of the excepted signs in terms of size, height, lighting, etc.-should apply equally to all noncommercial signs, regardless of the message on the sign.
Remove/Avoid "Problem" Definitions
To avoid post-Reed liability associated with certain types of noncommercial speech, local governments should remove or reconsider potentially problematic categories and definitions in sign codes. Some of these problem definitions include "political signs," "religious signs," "event 69 successfully claim that the purpose for the facially content-neutral definition was to allow for the display of real estate signs, which would then subject the provision to strict scrutiny. Similarly, if the definition of "event sign" is "a temporary sign displayed within 500 feet of property on which a one-time event is held, and which sign may be displayed for up to five days before and one day after such event," the "event sign" could read "Smoke Grass," but the event proponent's interest in promoting the event would likely win the day.
In other cases, some of the problem sign types should simply be avoided. For example, it is nearly impossible to define "political sign" or "religious sign" in a manner that does not create serious content bias issues. If a community has concerns regarding proliferation of these sign types, the problem is best addressed with regulations applicable to all noncommercial signs. As
Reed espouses, it is not within the purview of local government to pick and choose the subject matter or message of noncommercial speech, or to favor certain types of noncommercial speech over others. To the extent local political leaders are concerned about proliferations of political or religious signs, lawyers and planners should endeavor to educate political leaders about the risks associated with sign regulations of this nature.
B. Avoid Strict Enforcement of Content Based Distinctions and Moratoria
Local governments are also well-advised to suspend enforcement of code provisionsparticularly regulation of non-commercial signs-that Reed calls into question. This obviously does not include any structural and locational provisions in the sign code directly related to public safety. All of these should continue to be enforced. In a case decided shortly before Reed, a federal court upheld an Oregon county's decision to cease enforcement of content based 26 Even if the sign code is contained within the zoning code, the authors strongly recommend a separate severability clause be placed in the sign code.
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D.
Apply an Empirical Approach to Justify Sign Regulations, Where Possible
Sign codes require justification with purpose statements. Recitations of regulatory purposes should be supported by some form of empirical study or data. Short, glib statements regarding regulatory purposes do not reflect any degree of thoughtfulness regarding sign regulations, and they leave a local government without evidentiary support for its stated purposes in the event of litigation. To that end, local governments should consider employing at least some study and analysis in preparing regulatory purpose statements. Two approaches are discussed below. Using a comprehensive planning process to identify aesthetic concerns generated by signage, or employing traffic safety analysis can assist in purpose statement preparation.
Traffic Safety Studies
While many local sign codes recite traffic safety as a central purpose for sign regulation, very few substantiate the conclusion that a proliferation of signs-or certain types of signs-has actually caused traffic safety concerns in the community. Indeed, some lawyers and sign industry advocates have questioned whether signs-particularly in a world of smart phones, navigation systems, and other driver distractions-contribute at all to driver distraction and traffic incidents. Local governments are therefore advised to conduct studies, or at least consult studies prepared by national experts, to more carefully determine the safety concerns associated with outdoor signage. 27 Local government fire and safety personnel may also be helpful in 
Comprehensive Planning
Comprehensive planning is another source of empirical study that can be used to justify and defend sign codes. Signs are not often the focus of comprehensive planning, however, the visual impact of signs on communities and corridors weighs in favor of including sign issues in communities' land use planning processes. To the extent signs are addressed in a local comprehensive plan, the plan can help to identify and direct sign regulation toward the most pressing sign issues in the community. Moreover, a good comprehensive plan containing robust analysis of sign issues in the community provides good evidentiary support in sign code litigation. While the foregoing code provision would likely satisfy Reed, it may be difficult to enforce and may not accomplish all of the objectives of the local government. Another approach, albeit one with greater risk exposure, is to define signs according the activities occurring where the sign is located. For example, a content neutral definition of a "construction sign" might be "a temporary sign placed within a parcel of property upon which construction activities of any type are being actively performed." The code could contain definitions similar to this one for real estate signs. "Grand opening signs" could be defined as "a temporary sign placed within a parcel of property, not to exceed thirty two (32) square feet, and which may be displayed for a period not to exceed ninety (90) days following the sale, lease, or other conveyance of the parcel or any interest therein." Event-based signs could fall under a regulation that defines an "event sign" as "a sign not to exceed twelve (12) square feet that is placed no 77 more than two (2) weeks prior to and no more than two (2) days following a registered event,"
E.
Regulation of Sign Function in a Content
and which requires a registration of events with the permitting jurisdiction.
Assuming the code provided a category for general temporary noncommercial signage, these code provisions would be more likely to satisfy Reed than a code that articulates definitions based solely on the message of signs. Note, however, that the aforementioned provisions have not been tested in courts, and even Reed may call into the question the validity of such regulations under the rationale that these regulations exhibit subtle content bias. Even so, to the extent local governments desire to regulate signs according to function, the authors advise against such regulation, as any type of functional or categorical regulation will lead to increased risk exposure for the local government.
F.
Permitting and Enforcement
As with other areas of regulation, in addition to being informed by the local government's tolerance for risk management, sign regulations should also be based upon the local government's appetite for and ability to enforce the regulations. Enforcement of sign regulations is rarely an easy task, and improper enforcement of sign regulations can lead to serious trouble.
29
Local governments should therefore consider the enforcement of sign regulations before and during the drafting process, rather than after adoption of the regulations.
The availability of online registration systems may greatly ease enforcement headaches of local governments. For example, it may be possible for a local government to require any person displaying a temporary sign to register the sign with the local government on its website.
Such an online registration system would not act as a bar to an individual's right to display a 29 Selective enforcement claims arising in the enforcement of speech regulations may give rise to liability for local governments. See, e.g., LaTrieste Restaurant and Cabaret, Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994) .
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With the advent of digital technology, there is significant room for creativity in enforcing sign regulations, so long as the local government is not using such enforcement mechanisms to subvert First Amendment obligations. 
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Conclusion
Reed is likely to precipitate a significant shift in courts' treatment of sign codes under a First Amendment challenge. Local governments thus would be wise not merely to consider Reed when developing a dew sign code but to undertake sign code reviews and, if necessary, revise now to ensure that the code does not contain any of the content-based distinctions that created problems for Gilbert. Where necessary, local governments should consult resources-including planners and lawyers knowledgeable in First Amendment issues-to be certain that sign codes do not carry more risk than the local government desires to bear.
